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PRODUCT SEPARABILITY IN FRANCHISE
TYING ARRANGEMENTS: THE FOURTH
CIRCUIT'S NEW RULE
A tying arrangement or tie-in exists when a seller conditions a
buyer's purchase of a desired product (tying item) on the buyer's agree-
ment to purchase another product (tied item).' Courts condemn tie-ins
under the antitrust laws2 to prevent sellers from foreclosing competition
in the tied product market by depriving competing sellers of the oppor-
tunity to vie for the business of the buyer.' The tying doctrine has had
I See, e.g., United States Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enterprises, Inc., 429 U.S. 610, 611
(1977) (defendant alleged to tie purchase of prefabricated houses to extension of credit);
United States v. Loew's Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 44-45 (1962) (defendant tied sale of unwanted, in-
ferior films to sale of copyrighted feature films); Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356
U.S. 1, 5-6 (1958) (defendant sold and leased land on condition that grantee or lessee use
defendant's facilities for shipping all commodities produced on land). See generally 16 H J.
VON KALINOWSKI, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS: ANTITRUST LAWS AND TRADE REGULATION §
64.01[1] (1969) [hereinafter cited as VON KALINOWSKI].
Courts have stated that sellers can impose tie-ins by the course of conduct between
the parties as well as by express language. E.g., Photovest Corp. v. Fotomat Corp., 606 F.2d
704, 724 (7th Cir. 1979), cert& denied, 445 U.S. 917 (1980); Advance Business Systems and
Supply Co. v. SCM Corp., 415 F.2d 55, 66 (4th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 920 (1970).
2 Courts have found tying arrangements illegal under § 1 of the Sherman Act, § 3 of
the Clayton Act, and § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act.
Section 1 of the Sherman Act provides in pertinent part, "Every contract, combina-
tion in the form of trust of otherwise or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce among
the several states or with foreign nations is declared to be illegal." 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976). For
decisions holding tying arrangements illegal under § 1 of the Sherman Act, see United
States v. Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 52 (1962); Times-Picayune Pub. Co. v. United States, 345
U.S. 594, 627 (1953).
Section 3 of the Clayton Act makes the sale or lease of goods, wares, and merchandise
illegal when the effect of the sale or lease is to "substantially lessen competition." 15 U.S.C.
§ 14 (1976). For cases holding tying arrangements illegal under § 3 of the Clayton Act, see
International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 393-95, 402, appeal dismissed, 332 U.S.
747 (1947); United Shoe Mach. Corp. v. United States, 258 U.S. 451, 465 (1922).
Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act provides in pertinent part, "Unfair
methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts in commerce are declared unlawful:' 15
U.S.C. § 456 (1976). See FTC v. Texaco Inc., 393 U.S. 223, 224, 231 (1968) (holding tie-in il-
legal under § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act).
3 E.g., Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958); International Salt Co.
v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 396, appeal dismissed, 332 U.S. 747 (1947).
In addition to preventing tied product market foreclosure, a second reason courts
have stated for striking down tie-ins is the need to prevent interference with buyers' free
choice. E.g., Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 503 (1969);
United States v. Loew's Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 45 (1962). The Supreme Court substantially
repudiated the "buyers' free choice" rationale in Continental T.V., Inc. v. G.T.E. Sylvania
Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977). In Sylvania the Court held that the autonomy of independent
businessmen was an inadequate justification because it was unrelated to price, quality and
quantity of goods and services. Id. at 53, n.21.
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an important impact on trademark franchising.4 Many trademark fran-
chisors require franchisees to purchase goods and services along with
the trademark license as part of a franchise "package."
5 As a result,
dissatisfied franchisees often allege that the franchisor is tying the
goods and services included in the package (tied products) to the pur-
chase of the trademark license (tying product).' In a recent case, Principe
v. McDonald's Corp.," the Fourth Circuit created a new rule which will
permit franchisors to market seemingly separate products as part of a
mandatory franchise package in a greater number of situations.'
Courts often examine business practices challenged under the anti-
trust laws under the rule of reason.' In rule of reason cases, courts
balance the anticompetitive effects of a business practice against socially
beneficial effects of the practice to determine whether an unreasonable
' See Note, Trademark Franchising and Antitrust Law: The Two-Product Rule for
Tying Arrangements, 27 SYRACUSE L. REV. 953, 953-54 (1976) [hereinafter cited as
Trademark Franchising]. Trademark franchising is a method of doing business in which the
franchisor of a trademarked product, method, or service permits affiliated franchisees to
sell the product, method, or service in accordance with procedures established by the fran-
chisor. See 16 H VON KAL1NOWSKI, supra note 1, § 65.0111]; Trademark Franchising, supra
note 4, at 955.
Commentators identify three types of trademark franchises. The first type is the
enterprise franchise in which the franchisee operates an independently owned business
under the franchisor's trademark. The franchisor provides the trade name and usually pro-
vides a complete method of doing business. The franchisee agrees to use the business
method and follow the controls the franchisor puts on the operation of the business. See 16
H VON KALINOWSKI, supra note 1, § 65.0111]. For cases involving the enterprise franchise,
see Warriner Hermetics, Inc. v. Copeland Refrig. Corp., 463 F.2d 1002, 1012-16 (5th Cir.),
cert denied, 409 U.S. 1086 (1972) (air conditioning and refrigeration compressor franchise);
Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 448 F.2d 43, 47-53 (9th Cir. 1971) cert. denied, 405 U.S. 955
(1972) (fast food franchise). The second type of franchise is the distributorship franchise, in
which the manufacturer distributes his finished goods to consumers by means of a franchise
system. The franchisee is licensed to sell the product under the franchisor's trademark
which identifies the product, but the franchisee maintains his own business identity and
trademark. See Redd v. Shell Oil Co., 524 F.2d 1054, 1056 (10th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425
U.S. 912 (1976) (distributorship franchise); 16 H. VON KALINOWSKI, supra note 1, § 65.01;
Trademark Franchising, supra note 4, at 955-56. The third type of franchise exists when the
manufacturer or processor supplies a secret formula or process to a licensee who produces
the finished product and sells the product to consumers under the trademark. See 16 H VON
KALINOWSKI, supra note 1, § 65.01.
The Fourth Circuit has held that the essence of a modern franchise is the purchase
of several products in a single package. Phillips v. Crown Cent. Petroleum Corp., 602 F.2d
616, 628 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1074 (1979).
' See, e.g., Northern v. McGraw-Edison Co., 542 F.2d 1336, 1340-42 (8th Cir. 1976) (ty-
ing lease and equipment to franchise license); Capra, Inc. v. Ward Foods, Inc., 536 F.2d 39,
45-47 (5th Cir. 1976) (tying of food, supplies, and equipment to franchise license); Siegel v.
Chicken Delight, 448 F.2d 43, 46-47 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 955 (1972) (tying of
equipment, dry mix food items, and packaging items to franchise license).
631 F.2d 303 (4th Cir. 1980).
Id. at 310-11; see text accompanying notes 49-78 infra.
'See Ross, The Single Product Issue in Antitrust Tying: A Functional Approach, 23
EMORY L.J. 963, 966 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Ross].
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restraint of trade exists.10 Courts have held, however, that tying ar-
rangements are inherently anticompetitive and, therefore, are illegal
per se under the Sherman Act 1 if three prerequisites exist.12 First, the
11 E.g., Continental T.V., Inc. v. G.T.E. Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49 n.15 (1977);
Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918); Standard Oil Co. v. United
States, 221 U.S. 1, 51 (1911). In balancing the benefits of a challenged business practice
against the practice's anticompetitive effects courts consider the business' condition before
and after the manufacturer imposed the restraint, the nature of the restraint, the reasons
for adopting the restraint, the effect of the restraint on the market place. Chicago Board of
Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. at 238.
" 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976); see note 2 supra (text of Sherman Act § 1).
1 Northern Pacific Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 6 (1958). Courts find tie-ins per se
illegal under § 3 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1976), if two prerequisites exist. First,
the arrangement must involve two distinct products and provide that one cannot be obtained-
without purchasing the other. See International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 398,
appeal dismissed, 332 U.S. 757 (1957); text accompanying note 15 infra. Second, the ar-
rangements must either involve a "not insubstantial amount of commerce" or the tying pro-
duct "must yield sufficient economic power to restrain competition in the market for the
tied product." International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. at 396; see text accompany-
ing notes 13 & 14 infra.
Courts have mentioned two other requirements for per se illegality under § 1 of the
Sherman Act in addition to the traditional three. See text accompanying notes 13-15 infra
(traditional three requirements). Some courts state that the defendant must have coerced
the buyer into purchasing unwanted tied products. E.g., Ungar v. Dunkin' Donuts of
America, Inc., 531 F.2d 1211, 1225 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 823 (1976); American Mfrs.
Mut. Ins. Co. v. American Broadcasting-Paramount Theatres, Inc., 446 F.2d 1131, 1137 (2d
Cir. 1971). Courts generally find, however, that an expressed contractual provision which
establishes a tying arrangement is presumptive proof of coercion. Milonas v. Amerada Hess
Corp., 1976-2 Trade Cas. 61,069, 69,818-20 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); In re 7-Eleven Franchise Anti-
trust Litigation, 1972 Trade Case. 74,156, 92,830-31 (N.D. Cal. 1972). But see Capital Tem-
poraries, Inc. v. Olsten Corp., 506 F.2d 658, 662-63 (2d Cir. 1974) (individual coercion must be
found.even if an expressed contractual provision exists). Courts generally have held that in
the absence of an express contractual provision, the plaintiff must demonstrate coercion.
E.g., American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. American Broadcasting-Paramount Theatres, Inc., 446
F.2d at 1137; Abercrombie v. Lum's Inc., 345 F. Supp. 387, 391 (S.D. Fla. 1972). But see Hill
v. A. T. 0. Inc., 535 F.2d 1349, 1355 (2d Cir. 1976) (individual coercion never a separate ele-
ment of tie-in claim). A separate individual coercion requirement is illusory, however,
because the third requirement for § 1 per se illegality alreadi demands that two separate
products exist and that the purchase of the tying product be conditioned upon the purchase
of the tied product. See text accompanying note 15 infra. Thus, a buyer who wants the tying
product always is coerced into buying the tied product. See text accompanying note 1 supra
(defining illegal tie-in).
Some courts state "lack of justification" as a requirement for § 1 per se illegality.
These courts inquire into whether legitimate business reasons exist for declaring the tie-in
to be reasonable and, therefore, legal under the Sherman Act. See Siegel v. Chicken
Delight, Inc., 448 F.2d 43, 50 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 955 (1972); Susser v.
Carvel Corp., 332 F.2d 505, 519 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 379 U.S. 885 (1964), cert. dismissed,
381 U.S. 125 (1965). Courts have considered legitimate business reasons both to determine if
an arrangement is reasonable, and to determine if an arrangement involves more than one
product. See text accompanying notes 31-41 infra (legitimate business reason analysis used
to determine product separability). One commentator has suggested that the best place in
which to undertake legitimate business reason analysis is the product separability area. See
Dore, The 'Total Product" Approach to Analysis of Alleged Tying Arrangements, 34
1981] 1197
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tying product must yield sufficient economic power "to appreciably
restrain competition in the market for the tied product.""u Second, the
seller's tying arrangement policy must affect a "not insubstantial
amount of commerce."'4 Third, the arrangement must involve two dis-
tinct products and must provide that the buyer cannot obtain one with-
out purchasing the other. 5
Proof of the first two requirements for per se liability has become in-
creasingly easy for the party alleging the tie-in."6 Thus, a court's deter-
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 409, 417 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Dore]. Contra, Ross, supra note 9,
at 992-93.
," Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 6 (1958); see text accompanying note
16 infra (proof of economic power requirement has become increasingly easy for the party
alleging tie-in).
11 International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 396, appeal dismissed, 332 U.S.
757 (1947); see text accompanying note 16 infra (proof of "not insubstantial" requirement has
become increasingly easy for party alleging tie-in).
15 Time-Picayune Pub. Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 613-14 (1953); see text accom-
panying notes 19-48 (discussion of product separability requirement for per se illegality
under Sherman Act).
'" The earliest Supreme Court decisions on tying arrangements held that sufficient
economic power to establish a per se § 1 violation existed only if the seller enjoyed a domi-
nant or monopolistic position in the market for the tied product. E.g. Times-Picayune Pub.
Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 549, 608-09 (1953); United Shoe Mach. Corp. v. United States,
258 U.S. 451, 457-58 (1922). The Court has relaxed the high standard described in earlier
cases significantly. In Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958), the Court held
that sufficient economic power exists if the seller imposes tie-ins on a "host" of buyers and
no other explanation exists for the existence of the arrangements. Id. at 6. In United States
v. Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S. 38 (1962), the Supreme Court further relaxed the economic power
requirement by holding that economic power could be inferred from the uniqueness of the
tying product. Id. at 45. In United States Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enterprises, Inc., 429 U.S.
610 (1977), the Supreme Court defined the term "uniqueness." Id. at 620-22. The Court held
that a product is sufficiently unique to provide the requisite economic power for a tying viola-
tion when the seller enjoys a cost advantage over competing sellers in the production of the
product or when other sellers cannot offer the same product as a result of some legal or
physical barrier. Id. Courts have held that three legal barriers, the copyright, the patent,
and the trademark, are capable of providing the economic power necessary to establish the
economic power requirement for per se illegality under the Sherman Act. E.g. United
States v. Loew's Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 44-45 (1968) (copyright and patent); International Salt Co.
v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 396 (patent), appeal dismissed, 332 U.S. 747 (1947); Siegel v.
Chicken Delight, Inc., 448 F.2d 43, 50 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 955 (1972)
(trademark). But see Capital Temporaries, Inc. v. Olsten Corp., 506 F.2d 658, 662-63 (2d Cir.
1974) (trademark does not provide the economic power for per se violation). The Supreme
Court has held that the location and value of the seller's land is a sufficient physical barrier
to provide the economic power necessary for a per se violation of the Sherman Act. See
Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. at 3.
The Supreme Court also has relaxed significantly the requirement that a "not insub-
stantial amount of commerce" be involved in the transaction. The current test is whether
the total monetary amount of commerce involved in the use of the challenged practice is
"not insubstantial." Courts have held that relatively small amounts of money satisfy the re-
quirement. E.g., Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 502
(1969) ($200,000); Aamco Automatic Transmissions, Inc. v. Tayloe, 407 F. Supp. 430, 436
(E.D. Pa. 1976) ($50,000).
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mination of whether the first two requirements for per se liability exist
rarely is crucial to the outcome of the litigation.' Consequently, the
determination of whether the arrangement involves two separate pro-
ducts has increased in importance.'8
The leading case on the issue of product separability is United
States v. Jerrold Electronics Corp.'" In Jerrold, the district court
established a two step analysis for determining whether an amalgama-
tion of items is separable into two or more products for tie-in purposes. 0
Under the Jerrold test, courts first inquire whether the alleged tying
and tied products are normally separable.2' If the two items are normally
separable, courts determine whether legitimate business reasons exist
for considering the items to be one product.'
The determination of whether alleged tying and tied items are nor-
mally separable often depends on how a court views the particular facts
involved.' Commentators, however, have identified four general ap-
proaches. 4 In one approach courts inquire whether the two items are
fungible.' If the items are reasonably interchangeable, a court will not
find separate products. 8 Under a second approach, courts find that the
alleged tying and tied items are one product if a patent defines the
amalgamation as one product. Under a third technique courts inquire
whether the combination of allegedly separate products involves a cost
savings to the manufacturer apart from the cost savings normally pre-
sent in any tie-in. 8 A fourth technique courts use to determine whether
17 See Dore, supra note 12, at 411-12.
" See text accompanying note 17 supra (courts have reduced importance of economic
requirements for per se illegality under Sherman Act); Ross, supra note 9, at 972-73 (reduc-
tion of importance of economic requirements has made product separability determination
crucial).
19 187 F. Supp. 545, 560 (E.D. Pa. 1960), affd per curiam, 365 U.S. 567 (1961); see Dore,
supra note 12, at 413-14.
1 See Dore, supra note 12, at 413-14; for cases following the two step Jerrold test, see
Northern v. McGraw-Edison Co., 542 F.2d 1336, 1347 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
1097 (1977); Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 448 F.2d 43, 50 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405
U.S. 955 (1972).
21 See Dore, supra note 12, at 413.
1 See Ross, supra note 9, at 989-90; text accompanying notes 31-41 infra (describing
legitimate business justification analysis).
" See Trademark Franchising, supra note 4, at 964.
24 See Ross, supra note 9, at 973-1000.
See id. at 973-84 (describing fungibility analysis).
See, e.g., Times-Picayune Pub. Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 613 (1953)
(newspaper space in morning paper and afternoon paper constitutes one product,
newspaper space); Washington Gas Light Co. v. Virginia Elec. and Power Co., 438 F.2d 248,
253 (4th Cir. 1971) (electricity). But cf, Ross, supra note 9, at 981 (criticizing Washington Gas
Light decision on grounds that court failed to recognize the tied product).
" See Turner, The Validity of Tying Arrangements Under the Antitrust Laws, 72
HARV. L. REV. 50, 57-58 (1958).
2 An example of a single product under cost savings analysis is an automobile with a
dashboard. See Ross, supra note 9, at 1014. Cost savings for the purpose of product
1981] 1199
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an amalgamation is separable is to examine whether a separate market
exists for the alleged tied and tying items." If the tied product can be
marketed separately from the tying product, the items are normally
separable."
The second step of Jerrold product separability analysis is a deter-
mination of whether legitimate business reasons justify treating normally
separable products as one product for antitrust purposes." Although
courts frequently state that tie-ins are per se illegal, the business
justification step in product separability analysis is actually a rule of
reason inquiry into whether the combination of items is a reasonable
restraint of trade.2 If the combination is a reasonable restraint of trade
because of legitimate business reasons, courts find only one product and
uphold the arrangement.3 This business justification exception to the
tie-in per se rule has been a narrow one. Courts have not balanced the
beneficial effects of alleged tying arrangements against the arrange-
ments' anticompetitive effects. Courts have found legitimate business
reasons for combining normally separable products only when the seller
would suffer substantial injury if the combination were disallowed and
the harm could not be avoided in a less restrictive manner.'
The courts have found legitimate business justification for upholding
combinations of normally separable items in three situations.5 First, a
separability does not include mere savings in sales expense normally present in any tie-in
because if so, all tie-ins would be permissible. Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 448 F.2d 43, 48
(9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 955 (1972).
1 See Ross, supra note 9, at 1008; Note, Product Separability: A Workable Standard
to Identify Tie-in Arrangements Under the Antitrust Laws, 46 S. CAL. L. REV. 160, 163-69
(1972). In United States v. Jerrold Elecs. Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545 (E.D. Pa. 1960), affd per
curiam, 365 U.S. 567 (1961), the district court considered four criteria in examining whether
separate markets exist. Id. at 559. The court considered whether the seller's competitors
also sold only the aggregation, whether the number of components in the alleged product
varied among buyers, whether the buyer charged by individual components or by the whole
product, and whether the seller required that all necessary components be purchased from
him. Id.
. See Ross, supra note 9, at 1008-09.
3' See Dore, supra note 12, at 413.
See Ross, supra note 9, at 966.
For cases holding a combination of items to be reasonable and, therefore, one pro-
duct, see Foster v. Maryland State Sav. & Loan Assoc., 590 F.2d 928, 933-35 (D.C. Cir. 1978),
cert. denied, 442 U.S. 917 (1979); Kugler v. Aamco Automatic Transmissions, Inc., 560
F.2d 1214, 1215-16 (8th Cir. 1972); In re 7-Eleven Franchise Antitrust Litigation, 1974-2
Trade Cas. 75,429, 98,427-28 (N.D. Cal. 1974).
1 See Dore, supra note 12, at 416-417. For cases holding that legitimate business
justification exists only when the seller would suffer substantial injury if the combination
were disallowed, and when the combination is the only way to avert the injury, see Susser
v. Carvel Corp., 332 F.2d 505, 519 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 379 U.S. 885 (1964), cert. dismissed,
381 U.S. 125 (1965); Dehydrated Process Co. v. A. 0. Smith Corp., 292 F.2d 653, 655-57 (1st
Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 931 (1961); United States v. Jerrold Elecs. Corp., 187 F. Supp.
545, 556-58 (E.D. Pa. 1960), affd per curiam, 365 U.S. 567 (1961).
11 See 16 H VON KALINOWSKI, supra note 1, § 64.05[1].
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legitimate business justification exists when the aggregation is
necessary to prevent erosion of the goodwill the seller has obtained with
respect to the tying product. 8 This business justification does not exist
when the seller can protect the tying product's goodwill by specifying
the type and quality of the tied product to be used in connection with the
tying productY The goodwill justification for a combination of normally
separable items exists, therefore, only when specifications for a substi-
tute product would be impracticable.s Another business justification for
combining normally separable items exists during the experimental
period of a new industry when the seller has an interest in assuring the
proper functioning of equipment to prevent customer dissatisfaction at
the industry's inception. 9 This business purpose disappears after the in-
dustry becomes established and the combination is not critical to the in-
dustry's survival." A third valid business reason exists when the seller
can protect the alleged tying product from wholesale customer dissatis-
faction only by combining another product or service to the alleged tying
product.
4'1
Courts have applied the two step product separability analysis of the
Jerrold court to tying arrangement litigation in the trademark franchis-
ing area. 2 In trademark franchising tie-in cases a court first must detern
mine if the trademark license is normally separable from other goods
and services included in the franchise package. Courts frequently use
the separate market technique" to determine if a trademark license is a
normally separate product. 5 If a court determines that the trademark
license can be marketed separately from other goods and services in-
cluded in the franchise package, the court will find two normally
separable products. 6
See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 306 (1949); International Bus.
Mach. Corp. v. United States, 398 U.S. 131, 138-40 (1936).
" Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 306 (1949).
ISId.
See United States v. Jerrold Elecs. Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545, 556-58 (E.D. Pa. 1960),
affd per curiam, 365 U.S. 567 (1961) (tying service contract and supplementary equipment
to desired antenna equipment upheld to prevent destruction of infant cable television in-
dustry).
Id. at 538.
4 See Dehydrating Process Co. v. A. 0. Smith Corp., 292 F.2d 653, 654-55 (1st Cir.),
cert. denied, 368 U.S. 931 (1961) (purchase of silos by buyers necessary to insure proper
functioning of unloading equipment).
I E.g., Northern v. McGraw-Edison Co., 542 F.2d 1336, 1346-47 (8th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 1097 (1977); Capra, Inc. v. Ward Foods, Inc., 536 F.2d 39, 45-47 (5th Cir.
1976); Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 448 F.2d 43, 50 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S.
955 (1972)..
See Trademark Franchising, supra note 4, at 970.
See text accompanying notes 29 & 30 supra (describing separate market technique
for determining if amalgamation is normally separable).
" See Trademark Franchising, supra note 4, at 972-73.
' One commentator has suggested that courts should examine the function of the
12011981]
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If a court finds that the trademark license is normally separable
from the other components of the franchise package, the court must then
inquire whether legitimate business reasons exist for upholding the com-
bination." Courts have found legitimate business reasons for the com-
bination only when inclusion of the goods and services in the franchise
package is necessary to prevent substantial harm to the franchise, and if
the harm cannot be avoided in any other manner. 8
In Principe v. McDonald's Corp.'9 the Fourth Circuit addressed the
problem of what constitutes legitimate business justification for combin-
ing normally separable products in a franchise package 0 McDonald's
Corporation (McDonald's)51 had entered into a standard McDonald's fran-
chise agreement with the plaintiffs.2 In the McDonald's franchise agree-
ment the franchisor agrees to grant the franchisee rights to use the
McDonald's food preparation system and sell food products under the
trademark to determine if a separate market exists for the trademark license. See id. at
975-84. If the function of the trademark is to represent the franchise's goodwill, quality stan-
dards, and method of doing business, the seller can market the trademark license separately
from other goods and services which the franchisor may include in the franchise package.
Id. at 974-75. A fast food chain trademark is an example of a "method of doing business"
trademark. A trademark which represents a fast food chain can be marketed separately
from food, packaging goods, and other goods and services which a franchisor might require
that the franchisee purchase as part of a franchise "package." Id. If, however, the function
of the trademark is to represent product origin, the trademark cannot be marketed
separately from the product it represents. Id A trademark which appears on a shaving
cream bottle is an example of a "product origin" trademark. A "product origin" trademark
is indistinguishable from the product it represents. Thus, no separate market exists for the
"product origin" trademark license. I&
"7 E.g., Northern v. McGraw-Edison Co., 542 F.2d 1336, 1347 (8th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 1097 (1977); Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 448 F.2d 43, 47-52 (9th Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 955 (1972).
" E.g., Northern v. McGraw-Edison Co., 542 F.2d 1336, 1347 (8th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 1097 (1977); Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 448 F.2d 43, 47-52 (9th Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 955 (1972).
9 631 F.2d 303 (4th Cir. 1980).
Id. at 308-11.
51 At the time suit was filed in McDonald's, the McDonald's system consisted of four
separate corporations. The parent was McDonald's Corp. A second corporation, Franchise
Realty Interstate Corp., acquired land for the construction of McDonald's restaurants, built
the restaurants, and leased the stores to franchisees. See note 54 infra (describing
Franchise Realty's role in the McDonald's system). A third corporation McOpco, operated
some franchises as company stores. A fourth corporation at the time the McDonald's suit
was filed was McDonald's Systems Inc., which licensed franchise rights. McDonald's Corp.
subsequently effected a merger with McDonald's Systems. 631 F.2d at 305 n.3.
" 631 F.2d 306. The plaintiffs in McDonald's were Frank A. Principe, Ann Principe, and
Frankie Inc., a closely held corporation owned by Frank Principe and Raymond Principe. Id.
At the time plaintiffs entered into the 20 year agreement with McDonald's, the standard
McDonald's franchise agreement actually was two agreements, a franchise contract, and a
separate lease for the store premises rented by the franchisor. McDonald's Corp. stopped
using the two agreement practice in 1976. The company now consolidates the two
agreements into one document. Id. at 306 n.5.
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company's trademark.' The franchisee agrees to rent a store from
McDonald's and conduct franchise operations in this store." The fran-
chisee also must pay a $12,500 franchise fee, remit three percent of gross
sales as a royalty, remit eight and one half percent of gross sales as rent,
and post a $15,000 refundable security deposit.55 McDonald's Corporation
does not require the franchisee to purchase food or equipment from the
franchisor.5 8
The plaintiffs sued McDonald's Corporation, alleging that the com-
pany had violated the antitrust laws by tying the store lease and security
deposit to the franchise license. 7 The trial court granted summary judg-
ment in favor of the defendants on the security deposit allegation. The
court held that the security deposit was nothing more than a deposit
against loss, and, as such, was inseparable from the lease to which the
deposit pertained.' The trial court directed a verdict in favor of defen-
dants on the lease tie-in allegation, holding as a matter of law that the
McDonald's franchise agreement constituted one product."
Id at 306.
Id. at 306 n.7. McDonald's usually begins building a store long before entering into
an agreement with a franchisee. McDonald's selects the sites for the new stores carefully.
The company does extensive statistical research to determine which sites would be suited
best for expansion. After McDonald's Corp., see note 51 supra, acquires the land and builds
the store. Franchise Realty builds only the store shell. The franchisee assumes responsibility
under the lease for building maintenance, taxes, improvements, and other costs incurred in
maintaining the store. 631 F.2d at 305-07.
631 F.2d at 306-07.
Id. The franchisee must purchase the equipment from sources other than
McDonald's. The company does, however, provide specifications for the equipment. Id.
" The plaintiffs complaint filed in the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia alleged numerous violations of federal and state antitrust laws as well as
state franchising laws. Id. at 304. Before trial the district court dismissed all other allega-
tions except the tying arrangement allegations and the plaintiffs' allegation that
McDonald's denied the plaintiffs an additional franchise in retaliation for plaintiffs refusal
to follow McDonald's Corporation's pricing guidelines. Id at 304-05. The district court sub-
mitted to the jury the issue of whether McDonald's denied plaintiffs an additional franchise
in retaliation for plaintiffs' refusal to follow McDonald's pricing guidelines. Id. at 305. The
jury returned an unsolicited note. In the note the jury stated that McDonald's had treated
the plaintiffs unfairly, but retaliation for failure to follow pricing guidelines had not occur-
red. Id The district court disregarded the note and entered judgement for McDonald's. Id
The plaintiffs appealed the retaliation issue and the Fourth Circuit agreed with the district
court that the unsolicited jury note did not affect the validity of the jury verdict. I&. at 311.
The plaintiffs did not appeal the counts dismissed before trial. Id at 305. •
I Id. The Fourth Circuit dismissed the security deposit issue with little comment. Id.
at 311. The Fourth Circuit agreed that the security deposit was not separable from the
lease. Id.
" In addition to the court's finding that one product existed, the trial court also stated
that it was directing a verdict on the lease allegation because the court found that the plain-
tiff had failed to introduce evidence concerning McDonald's economic power in the tying
product market. Id at 304-05; see text accompanying note 13 supra (describing economic
power requirement).
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The plaintiffs appealed to the Fourth Circuit, relying on Siegel v.
Chicken Deligh Inc.,"0 the leading case on the issue of franchising pro-
duct separability." In Chicken Delight the plaintiff alleged that the
defendant's standard franchise agreement violated the tying doctrine of
the antitrust laws.2 Under the franchise agreement the defendant fran-
chisor required franchisees to purchase cooking equipment, food items,
and packaging products in order to obtain the franchise license." The
Ninth Circuit initially held that the franchise could market the
trademark license separately from the other goods included in the
package and, therefore, the trademark license was a normally separable
product." The court also held that no legitimate business reasons ex-
isted for upholding the combination of separable products because the
franchisor could accomplish the company's business purpose in ways
other than a tying arrangement. 5 The plaintiffs in McDonald's urged the
Fourth Circuit to adopt the Ninth Circuit's product separability analysis,
and to find that the McDonald's standard franchise agreement established
an illegal tie-in."
0 448 F.2d 43 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 955 (1972).
" Principe v. McDonald's, 631 F.2d 303, 308 (4th Cir. 1980); see Trademark Franchis-
ing, supra note 4, at 970.
448 F.2d at 46-52.
Id. at 46-47.
Id. at 47-48. The Ninth Circuit looked to the function of the trademark to determine
if Chicken Delight's trademark license could be marketed separately from food, mixes and
packaging products also included in Chicken Delight's franchise "package." Id. at 49. The
court found that Chicken Delight's trademark represented the goodwill and quality stan-
dards of the Chicken Delight franchise and, as such, could be marketed separately from the
other goods included in the package. Id. at 48-49; see text accompanying notes 45 & 46 supra
("function of the trademark" analysis described).
' 448 F.2d at 47-52. Chicken Delight argued three business justification defenses.
First, Chicken Delight contended that the company's practice of combining the trademark
license with other goods and services was reasonable because the combination was
necessary for measuring and collecting revenue. Id. at 50. The Ninth Circuit rejected this
argument. The court held that Chicken Delight could accomplish the company's purpose of
collecting revenue by charging a royalty for the trademark license. Since Chicken Delight
could accomplish the company's purpose in another way, legitimate business justification
did not exist for the tie-in. Id. Second, Chicken Delight argued that the company's package
was reasonable under the "new business" defense. Id at 50-51; see text accompanying notes
39 & 40 supra (describing new business defense). The Ninth Circuit rejected Chicken
Delight's "new business" argument because Chicken Delight was not a new business during
the time period in which the plaintiffs purchased their franchise packages. The court stated
that the new business defense is not applicable after the industry becomes established and
the combination is not critical to the industry's survival. 448 F.2d at 51. Third, Chicken De-
light argued that the company's franchise package was reasonable because the package was
necessary to protect the goodwill Chicken Delight had established with respect to the com-
pany's franchises. Id. The Ninth Circuit rejected this business reason because Chicken
Delight could protect the company's goodwill by requiring franchisees to meet established
specifications. Since Chicken Delight could accomplish the company's business purpose in
another less restrictive way, the franchise package was not a reasonable restraint. Id. at
51-52; see text accompanying notes 36-38 supra (goodwill justification described).
631 F.2d at 305.
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McDonald's Corporation responded to the plaintiffs argument by
contending that the company offered franchisees one product, a unique,
highly profitable manner of doing business, and that the components of
the overall McDonald's package are necessary to insure the success of
both the franchisor and franchisee." The Fourth Circuit agreed, holding
that legitimate business reasons existed for upholding the McDonald's
franchise package. 8 By inquiring into business justification the Fourth
Circuit implicitly recognized that a trademark license and accompanying
lease are normally separable.69
In deciding whether legitimate business reasons existed for a find-
ing that the lease and trademark license should be considered one pro-
duct, the McDonald's court focused on whether the alleged tied products
were integral components of the franchised business method. 0 The
Fourth Circuit stated four business reasons to support the conclusion
that the lease is an important part of the McDonald's franchise package.
First, the practice of leasing completed stores to franchisees enables
McDonald's Corporation to select systematically the best franchise sites
and to use the company's enormous economic power to obtain these
sites.' The McDonald's Corporation site selection system not only allows
"Id. at 307-08. McDonald's engages in the business of developing fast-service, limited-
menu restaurant franchises. The company grants franchisees the right to operate for 20
years a specific franchise site owned by McDonald's Corp. McDonald's does not engage in
the business of selling foodstuffs, equipment, or other products to franchisees. The fran-
chisors sole source of profit, apart from an initial $12,500 franchise fee, is the monthly pay-
ments McDonald's receives from franchisees. I& The monthly payments consist of a fixed
percentage of the franchisee's sales. Id. McDonald's seeks to maximize the sale of fran-
chisees by selecting the best available sites for McDonald's restaurants and by keeping
these advantageous sites within the franchise system. The franchisor uses an intricate
marketing analysis to select the best sites and keeps these sites within the system by re-
taining ownership of the sites. Id. McDonald's also seeks to maximize the profits of the com-
pany's franchises by selecting franchisees who have great management potential and a will-
ingness to become involved in the day to day operation of the franchise. McDonald's teaches
franchisees the skills necessary to operate a franchise at the company's management school.
Id Moreover, McDonald's continues to consult and advise the franchisee after the fran-
chisee begins operating a McDonald's franchise. Id
Id at 310.
Courts inquire into whether legitimate business reasons exist for considering an
amalgamation to be one product only after finding that two normally separate products are
tied together. See text accompanying note 22 supra. Therefore, an inquiry into whether
legitimate business reasons exist for upholding a "package" is an implicit statement that
two normally separate products exist. A conclusion that the McDonald's franchise license
and lease are normally separate products is sound. The McDonald's franchise reflects the
goodwill, quality standards and method of doing business of McDonald's Corp., and, as such,
the franchise can be marketed separately from the other parts of the package. See note 46
supra (describing function of the trademark technique for determining if franchise license is
normally separable from other products in a franchise "package"). The franchise license is,
therefore, a normally separate product. Id.; see Photovest Corp. v. Fotomat Corp., 606 F.2d
704, 724-25 (7th Cir. 1979) (franchise license is normally separable from lease).
7'0 631 F.2d at 309-10.
"I Id at 310; see note 67 supra (describing importance of site selection process to
McDonald's system). McDonald's economic power to obtain the best franchise sites is enor-
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the company to select the best franchise sites for its stores, but also
enables the company to position these stores to avoid intra-franchise
competition.7" Second, the Fourth Circuit reasoned that the lease is im-
portant to the franchise because the McDonald's policy of owning all
franchise restaurants assures that the store will remain in the
McDonald's system.7" By keeping all the stores in the McDonald's
system, the company can prevent buildings whose architecture iden-
tifies them as McDonald's stores from sitting idle or being used for other
purposes which might damage the franchise system's goodwill." The
practice of keeping all stores in the McDonald's system also insures that
the best sites which McDonald's initially chooses will remain in use as
McDonald's stores.75 Third, the Fourth Circuit stated that the
McDonald's system enables the franchisor to select franchisees based on
their management potential rather than on the prospective franchisee's
real estate expertise or wealth.78 Finally, the Fourth Circuit found that
the lease is an integral part of the McDonald's Corporation franchise
system because both the franchisor and franchisee have a substantial
stake in the success of the restaurant.77 This financial stake creates a
partnership in which both partners have a strong incentive to cooperate
for their mutual benefit.78
The Fourth Circuit's analysis in the McDonald's case contradicted
the reasoning of most earlier decisions on the issue of business justifica-
tion for combining two normally separate products in a franchise
package. Prior to the McDonald's case, courts found only in a few limited
situations that a combination of normally separable products was a
reasonable restraint of trade, and therefore one product for antitrust
purposes. Courts found that a combination of separable products was
permissible only when the combination was necessary to prevent sub-
stantial harm to the franchise, and the harm could not be avoided in a
less restrictive manner.79 The Fourth Circuit did not inquire whether the
McDonald's package was the least restrictive alternative. The Fourth
mous. The company owns over 4000 stores and is the world's largest and most successful
fast food franchisor. See Martino v. McDonald's Systems, Inc., 81 F.R.D. 81, 84 (N.D. Ill.
1979).
72 631 F.2d at 310; see note 67 supra (describing importance of keeping best franchise
sites in the system to success of McDonald's).
" 631 F.2d at 310.
4 Id.
75 I&
76 Principe v. McDonald's, 631 F.2d 303, 310 (4th Cir. 1980); see note 67 supra (describ-
ing importance of policy of choosing franchisees based on management potential).
Principe v. McDonald's, 631 F.2d 303, 310-311 (4th Cir. 1980). The financial stake of
both the franchisor and franchisee is substantial in the McDonald's system. McDonald's
spends approximately $500,000 purchasing the land and building the restaurant. The fran-
chisee usually invests over $100,000. Id. at 311.
79 Id.
"' See text accompanying note 34 supra.
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Circuit focused instead on whether the alleged items were essential or
integral to the franchise in determining whether legitimate business
reasons existed for considering the McDonald's package to be one pro-
duct for antitrust purposes.0
The Fourth Circuit's new rule broadens the scope of previously nar-
row business justification analysis. Under the Fourth Circuit's new rule
the franchisor need not establish that the combination of alleged tied
and tying items is the only way the franchisor can prevent substantial
harm to the franchise. The franchisor need only establish that the nor-
mally separate products are integral parts of the franchise system."
Thus, courts applying the McDonald's analysis will uphold combinations
of normally separable items even though the franchisor could accomplish
his business purpose in another way other than the tie-in. The focus of a
court's inquiry under the new rule will be on the importance of the alleged
tied products to the success of the franchisor's system. Franchisors,
therefore, will be able to justify combinations of separable products in a
greater number of situations. Despite the McDonald's court's abandon-
ment of the least restrictive alternative principle, the Fourth Circuit's
new rule will not permit franchisors to sell franchise packages which are
an unreasonable restraint of trade. The practical effect of the McDonald's
court's expansion of the business justification rule is to subject franchise
tying arrangements to analysis under the rule of reason.82 Courts apply-
ing the McDonald's rule will balance the importance of the alleged tie-in
to the success of the franchise against the anticompetitive effects of the
arrangement on the tied product market. If the anticompetitive effects
of the package outweigh the package's beneficial effects, courts will
strike down the arrangement.
The Fourth Circuit's decision to broaden the business justification
rule, and, thus, subject trademark franchise tie-ins to rule of reason
analysis, was well reasoned. Commentators have pointed out that the
socially beneficial effects of many tie-ins outweigh the harmful effects of
the arrangements.' The trademark franchise package is an example of a
80 631 F.2d at 309-11. The Fourth Circuit's decision in McDonald's was not entirely un-
precedented. In In re 7-Eleven Franchise Antitrust Litigation, 1974-2 Trade Cas. 75,429
(N.D. Cal.), the district court held that a convenience store franchise package was not
separable into tied and tying products because the tied items were an integral part of the
franchise. Id., at 98,427-28. Cf. Foster v. Maryland State Say. & Loan Assoc., 590 F.2d 928,
931-32 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 842 (1979). (Court held that borrower's pay-
ment of attorney's fee integral part of loan transaction and, therefore, not separable).
"l See text accompanying note 70 supra.
' See text accompanying notes 9 & 10 supra (describing rule of reason analysis).
I See Austin, The Tying Arrangement A Critique and Some New Thoughts, 1967
WIs. L. REV. 88, 96-103; Baker, The Supreme Court and the Per Se Tying Rule: Cutting the
Gordian Knot, 66 VA. L. REV. 1235, 1267-1274 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Baker]; Bowman,
Tying Arrangements and the Leverage Problem, 67 YALE L.J. 19, 29-36 (1957); Lockhart &
Sacks, The Relevance of Economic Factors in Determining Whether Exclusive Arrange-
ments Violate Section Three of the Clayton Act, 65 HARv. L. REV. 913, 947, 951 (1952).
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tie-in in which the beneficial effects of the arrangement frequently
outweigh the anticompetitive effects." Trademark franchise packages
are not "inherently anticompetitive,'1 5 and, therefore, should be examined
under the rule of reason rather than a per se rule."
The McDonald's case is an excellent example of a franchise "tie-in"
in which the beneficial effects of the package outweigh the package's
harmful effects on a tied product market. Under the facts of McDonald's,
identification of harm to competition in a tied product market is impossi-
ble. The McDonald's policy of owning franchise restaurants does not
foreclose a realtor or commercial lessor from competing for a sale or
lease. The only effect of the McDonald's system is that the realtor must
sell or lease the restaurant site to the franchisor rather than the fran-
chisee. Competition in a real estate and lessors market is not affected if
McDonald's rather than the franchisee leases or purchases the restau-
rant site. While the McDonald's package involves no actual harm to com-
petition in a tied product market, the package is crucial to the success of
McDonald's Corporation. Through use of the company's franchise system
McDonald's Corporation has become the world's most successful fast
food franchisor.
Although the Fourth Circuit's new rule contradicts the reasoning of
earlier tie-in cases regarding what constitutes business justification, the
court's rule is consistent with the Supreme Court's current attitude
toward per se violations of the antitrust laws. In Continental T.V. v.
G.T.E. Sylvania, Inc.," the Supreme Court expressed an antagonistic
"See Baker, supra note 83, at 1236-37; Comment, Trademark Franchising and Anti-
trust Violations: The Need for a Limited Rule of Reason, 52 B.U.L. REV. 463, 478-79 (1972).
One commentator has suggested that the procompetitive effects of most trademark fran-
chise tie-ins outweigh the anticompetitive effects. See Baker, supra note 83, at 1236. This
commentator states two important procompetitive purposes which trademark franchises
may further. First, tie-ins are an important quality control device. Id. Second, tie-ins can be
an effective way to monitor and enforce the franchisor's rights under the franchise agree-
ment. If. for example, the franchisor sells food along with the franchise license, the fran-
chisor will be able to monitor accurately the amount of business conducted by the fran-
chisee, and will be assured an adequate return on the sale of the franchise license. Id. at
1277-81. This commentator also states that franchise tie-ins are not "anticompetitive"
because the arrangements have an insignificant effect on the price, quantity, and quality of
goods and services. Id. 1268-69.
"See text accompanying note 12 supra (tie-ins subjected to per se analysis because
the arrangements are considered inherently anticompetitive).
" See Baker, supra note 83, at 1268-69 (franchise tie-ins have little anticompetitive ef-
fect on price, quantity and quality of goods and services and, therefore, should be con-
sidered under the rule of reason).
I See note 71 supra; text accompanying notes 71-77 supra (importance of McDonald's
package to success of franchise system).
" 433 U.S. 36 (1977). In Sylvania the defendant, a manufacturer of television sets,
restricted the locations from which franchisees could sell the defendant's television sets. Id.
at 38. Continental T.V., one of Sylvania's franchisees, sued the manufacturer, alleging that
Sylvania had violated § 1 of the Sherman Act by imposing restrictions on the area from
which the franchisee could sell the television sets. Id. at 40. The district court ruled that
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view toward inflexible per se rules and a preference for economically
oriented antitrust analysis. 9 The Court stated in Sylvania that a
business practice should be analyzed under a per se rule only if the prac-
tice is "manifestly anticompetitive."'" In all other cases the practice
should be considered under the rule of reason.9 The Court held that a
business arrangement is manifestly anticompetitive if the arrangement
is such that the anticompetitive effects of the arrangement consistently
outweigh the pro-competitive effects.9
Earlier Supreme Court decisions also stated the general rule that
courts should not invoke per se analysis unless the practice is inherently
or manifestly anticompetitive.9 3 The Sylvania Court's definition of "an-
ticompetitive" is significant, however. Unlike earlier decisions, the
Supreme Court in Sylvania stated that a business practice was not an-
ticompetitive merely because the practice limited the autonomy of in-
dependent businessmen.9 The Court stated that in order for a business
practice to be anticompetitive the practice must have a demonstrable ef-
fect on the market for the product involved.9' Under the Court's new
definition of "anticompetitive", a court will subject a business practice to
a per se rule only if the anticompetitive effects on the price, quantity,
and quality of the product consistently outweigh the beneficial effects of
United States v. Arnold Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967) controlled the issue, and found
for the plaintiff, 433 U.S. at 40-41.
In Sckwinn the Supreme Court had held that manufacturer imposed restrictions on
where a product may be sold after the product leaves the control of the manufacturer are
per se illegal. Id. at 379. The court of appeals reversed, stating that Schwinn was not ap-
plicable, and Sylvania's restriction should be considered under the rule of reason. Continen-
tal T.V. Inc. v. G.T.E. Sylvania Inc., 537 F.2d 982, 988 (9th Cir. 1976) (en bane), affd, 433 U.S.
36 (1977). The Supreme Court agreed with the trial court and held that Schwinn was ap-
plicable to the Sylvania practice. 433 U.S. at 46. The Court, however, overruled Schwinn
and held that location restrictions are not manifestly anticompetitive and, therefore, should
be considered under the rule of reason. Id. at 58-59.
9 See Baker, supra note 83, at 1262.
Continental T.V. v. G.T.E. Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49-50 (1977).
"Id.
Id. at 50 n.16.
E.g., Northern Pac. By. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958); Standard Oil Co. v.
United States, 337 U.S. 293, 305-06 (1949).
" In Sylvania the defendant's policy of limiting the locations from which Sylvania pro-
ducts could be sold affected the autonomy of individual franchisees because franchisees
were not free to sell Sylvania products anywhere they desired. See note 89 supra. Tying ar-
rangements such as the McDonald's package similarly affect the autonomy of franchisees.
Under mandatory franchise packages such as the McDonald's package the franchisor does
not allow the franchisee a free choice of products. The franchisee must purchase the tied
products from the franchisor. See text accompanying note 54 supra. Since under Sylvania a
business practice is not anticompetitive merely because the practice limits the autonomy of
independent businessmen, franchise packages such as the McDonald's package are not an-
ticompetitive because the practices limit buyers' free choice of products. Under the analysis
of Sylvania, a franchise package is anticompetitive only if the package has a demonstrable
effect on the tied product market. See text accompanying note 96 infra.
11 433 U.S. at 58-59.
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the practice. Since "tying arrangements" such as the McDonald's
package involve substantial benefits to the tying product and have little
or no anticompetitive impact on a tied product market, the Supreme
Court may well determine that tie-ins such as the McDonald's package
should be analyzed under the rule of reason rather than a per se rule."
The Fourth Circuit's new business justification rule creates a con-
flict in the circuit courts concerning the issue of what constitutes
legitimate business justification for combining two normally separable
products in a franchise package. 7 The Supreme Court should grant cer-
tiorari in the McDonald's case and resolve the conflict by subjecting
franchise tying arrangements to analysis under the rule of reason. As
the McDonald's case well demonstrates, a franchise package may involve
substantial benefits to the franchisor and cause no harm to a tied pro-
duct market. Continued application of a per se rule to strike down "tie-
ins" such as the McDonald's package would be inconsistent with the
Sylvania doctrine, and economically unjustifiable. 8
KURT J. FISCHER
9' See text accompanying notes 86-87 supra.
9 For decisions holding that legitimate business justification exists only when the
franchisor would suffer substantial harm if the combination were disallowed, and the harm
cannot be avoided in any other manner, see Northern v. McGraw-Edison Co., 542 F.2d 1336,
1347 (8th Cir. 1976), cerL denied, 429 U.S. 1097, rehearing denied, 430 U.S. 960 (1977); Capra,
Inc. v. Ward Foods, Inc., 536 F.2d 39, 46-47 (5th Cir. 1976); Susser v. Carvel Corp., 332 F.2d
515, 519 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 379 U.S. 885 (1964), cert dismissed, 381 U.S. 125 (1965);
Dehydrating Process Co. v. A. 0. Smith Corp., 292 F.2d 653, 656-57 (1st Cir.), cert denied,
368 U.S. 931 (1961).
For decisions holding that legitimate business reasons exist for combining two normally
separable products when the tied product is an integral part of the franchise, see Principe v.
McDonald's Corp., 631 F.2d 363, 309-311 (4th Cir. 1980); Kugler v. Aamco Automatic
Transmissions, Inc., 460 F.2d 1214, 1215-1216 (8th Cir. 1972).
98 See Baker, supra, note 83, at 1274.
